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CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE*
JOHN P. RocHi t
IN T half-century which separated 1870 from 1920-which has been
styled the "Age of Enterprise'"-American society was put through
the wringer of the Industrial Revolution. American constitutional
law, like all other institutions, was transformed to meet the exigencies
of the new society, though some of the transformations were delayed
until virtually the eve of World War II. Elsewhere I have examined the
impact of the Age of Enterprise on the interpretation of the police
power and the commerce power.' Here we turn to the examination of
the place of civil liberties in the constitutional firmament of the Age of
Enterprise.
There are continuities that can be traced, and discontinuities that
can be identified, in the interpretation of the police power and the
commerce power. The constitutional lawyer who in 1963 dilates on these
topics is speaking essentially the same language as his predecessors in
1880 or 1920. But in the area of civil liberties there has been a qualita-
tive jump between the views of our legal ancestors and those of our
contemporaries. We can no more inquire how the Court in 1880 felt
about civil liberties than we can ask how the physicists of that era re-
sponded to the theory of relativity. As I have argued at length in my
recent study of civil liberties in modern America,2 the whole notion of
individual rights enforceable against the community, while traceable to
Abolitionist political theory, is a twentieth century legal innovation.
This is not to say that American political thought in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries did not endorse "civil rights." It did, but these
rights were defined in a very special, essentially majoritarian fashion as
safeguards against oppressive governmental action, i.e., legislative or ex-
ecutive "usurpations." Americans had, of course, fought the British for
their "civil rights" on precisely this ground: They demanded the right
to define their own rights. But nowhere except among the persecuted
* Adapted from a chapter in the forthcoming volume THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE AGE
OF ENTERPRISE.
-Morris Hillquit Professor of Labor and Social Thought, Brandeis University.
I See Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LABOR
HSToRY 3 (1963); Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power, 30 U.
CH. L. REv. 680 (1963).
2 RocHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DPEAaz: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LIBmRTES IN
MODERN AMEucA (1963).
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Abolitionists have I discovered any theoretical justification for minority
rights per se, and, as far as I can discover, state bills of rights extended no
protection to the individual nonconformist confronted by the wrath and
retribution of his neighbors. Although there must be some decisions of
this sort somewhere in the state reports, I have yet to find an early case
in which a state appellate court reversed a conviction below on the
basis of a state bill of rights. Typical, I suspect, was the 1838 decision
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the appeal of Abner
Kneeland,3 who asserted that his conviction for blasphemy violated the
religious freedom guaranteed by article II of the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights. Kneeland, who had denied the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, was
told by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw for the court that the blasphemy
statute was no limitation on his religious liberty-it merely punished acts
which had "a tendency to disturb the public peace." Article II, in Shaw's
view, gave full protection to "honest" religious dissenters but none to
those with "bad" motivation.4
Liberty, in short, was a condition conferred by the community at its
discretion, usually only to "good" people who had earned their preroga-
tives. John Stuart Mill gave this philosophy its classic nineteenth century
formulation in his essay On Liberty when, after extolling the individual's
absolute sovereignty over "his own body and mind," he hastened to add:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood .... For the same reason we may leave out of con-
sideration those backward states of society in which the race it-
self may be -considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in
the way of spontaneous progress are so great that there is seldom
any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the
spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients
that will attain an end perhaps otherwise unattainable. Des-
potism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement and the
means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a prin-
ciple, has no application to any state of things exterior to the
time when mankind have become capable of being improved by
free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them
but implicit obedience .... 5
3 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206 (1838). See also LEVY, THE LAw Or THE
COMMONVFALTH AND CHIEF JusrcE SHAW 43-58 (1957).
4 37 Mass. at 220.
5 MILL, ON LIBERTY 13-14 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
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Implicit in this statement-which those who praise Mill as the tribune
of the "open society" have curiously ignored-is a jurisdictional grant:
It is obviously the right of those who exercise liberty to determine when
others shall graduate from despotism to this blissful state. To put it
in the American context, it was the right of the community to decide
when the Irish, the Jews, the Negroes, the industrial workers, the Mor-
mons, or whatever deviant group, should be admitted to membership. To
return for a moment to the blasphemous Abner Kneeland, Chief Justice
Shaw did point out that the blasphemy statute had no relevance to a
"simple and sincere avowal of a disbelief in the existence and attributes
of God ' ' 3it constrained only the activities of insincere dissenters, i.e.,
Bad Men. When the American Legion argues today that Communists
should be excluded from the coverage of the Bill of Rights because the
party does not believe in civil rights, it is simply formulating in a con-
temporary context the standard eighteenth and nineteenth century maxim:
Bad Men Have No Rights. It was Jefferson, anticipating Joseph R. Mc-
Carthy, who announced in connection with the illegal arrest of the "Burr
Conspirators" that, whatever the constitutional niceties, Burr had it
coming, and that the public wanted no mercy shown to "traitors." 7
This is the background which must be appreciated if one is to under-
stand the Supreme Court's attitude towards civil liberties in the period
under analysis. Perhaps a few words are also in order on the character
of the Court and the general ideological position which it supported,
particularly in view of the fact that my views differ rather sharply from
many standard formulations.
A number of commentators on American constitutional law have, in
their explorations of this period, discovered a "conservative" bias in the
Supreme Court.8 If this elusive designation is used in a rough and ready,
essentially pejorative fashion to describe judicial favoritism towards the
business elite and dedication to the theology of entrepreneurial liberty,
there is no point in stirring up a terminological dispute. But if, on the
other hand, the word "conservative" is employed in any meaningful
ideological sense to suggest that the judiciary was inspired by a Burkean
conception of history or a deep attachment to the principles of com-
munity, the usage is absurd. A perverse logician using the same set of
6 37 Mass. at 220.
7 I am indebted to Leonard Levy for showing me his superb detailed study of
Jefferson's handling of the Burr Conspiracy which became a chapter in his recent
book, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963). See also ABERNATHY, THE BURR CON-
SPIRAcY (1954).
8 See JACOBS, LAW WRIrERS AND THE COURTS (1954); McCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CON-
SERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE (1951); PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RuL_
OF LAW (1960); TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
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facts could easily argue that the Court, and those who shared the judicial
viewpoint, were engaged in a destructive and fundamentally "radical"
assault on the underlying principles of American political theory. In the
name of what Karl Marx called the "pig philosophy," they blasted away
such antique notions as the obligation of the individual to the com-
munity (the Christian concept of "stewardship"), the subservience of
entrepreneurial ambition to the police power, and the passion for equal-
ity. From this angle of vision, the defenders of the police power are
converted into the "conservatives"-Burke's "little platoons"-in their
unsuccessful attempt to hold back the disruptive forces of entrepreneurial
aggrandizement.
On the abstract level, both positions can be defended indefinitely;
this, indeed, is what gives abstract argument its charm. But in concrete
terms, neither is viable, that is, supported by a coherent body of em-
pirical data. The problem has arisen from the employment of such
terms as "conservative," "radical," "liberal," or "progressive" in a sense
fundamentally European: Categories which may have meaning in the
analysis of European phenomena simply have not survived transplanta-
tion to the American scene. In fact, every attempt to utilize them in
the American context has led to an ideological shambles in which
analysts, hopelessly committed to their deductive categories, have saved
the day for Theory by improvising such emergency rubrics as "con-
servative-liberal" or "moderate progressive." Nowhere has the empty
character of these categories been more effectively demonstrated than
in the investigation of judicial behavior.
Take Mr. Justice Harlan, for example: While Harlan was "progres-
sive," if not "radical," in his dour view of monopolies and "trusts," his
dissent in Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.9 and his opinion of the
Court in Smythe v. Ames'0 put him high on the list of "reactionary"
enemies of the police power. But when two more variables are thrown
in, identification in any ideological sense becomes impossible: How does
one reconcile Harlan's solitary and magnificent defense of the deserted
Negro with his bitter prejudice against trade unions and their members?
There are, of course, explanations, but they have to be sougl-t in Harlan's
biography and in the personal scale of social, economic and political
value priorities that he developed." Mr. Justice Stephen Field was
probably about as close to being an ideologue as any Justice has ever
been, at least before Frank Murphy, but even Field knew when to rise
9 116 U.S. 307, 337 (1886).
10 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
11 See Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes, 66
YALE L.J. 637 (1957). Harlan's attitude towards trade unions suffuses his opinion in
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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above principle. The Justice, who insisted that the fourteenth amendment
had been designed to nationalize liberty, and who could work himself
into a frenzy over the plight of butchers deprived of their employment,
was totally unmoved by efforts to enforce the equal protection clause on
behalf of the Negroes12 or the due process clause in aid of the convicted,
Haymarket anarchists. 13 In short, to employ such designations as "con-
servative" or "liberal" is completely misleading (unless one simply means
by them "good" and "bad," in whichever order) in its pretension that
there are coherent philosophical patterns. These terms have been out-
lawed from this analysis.
The modern reader may be startled by some of the material included
in this essay-the Income Tax decisions, for example-and note the ab-
sence of much that he normally includes under the contemporary head-
ing of civil liberty. Perhaps the point should be reemphasized that each
epoch establishes its own definitions and the proper concern of the
historian is to examine the constitutional status of civil liberties as the
latter were defined in the legal and political lexicons of that time. As was
noted earlier, what we today think of as civil liberties largely date
from definitions adopted in the 1930s; the very absence of a civil rights
tradition was a distinctive characteristic of the period before World War
I. True, there were groups which fought for their own rights-radicals,
suffragettes, trade unionists, Jews, Negroes, etc., but they did so on an
ad hoc basis. The old Abolitionist dream of basic natural rights guaran-
teed by national power collapsed among the debris of Reconstruction,
and among civil libertarians, as elsewhere, the guiding maxim was sauve
qui peut. Finally, for reasons which I have examined at length else-
where,14 I consider World War I to be the watershed between the "old
America" and the "new" with respect to the development of a civil
liberties jurisprudence; I have therefore excluded from this study the
civil liberties problems that proliferated with American involvement in
the First World War.
Let us begin with the evisceration of the fourteenth amendment and
the Civil Rights Acts. We cannot take the time here to explore the logic
of the Civil Rights Cases15 in which the Supreme Court delivered the
coup de grace to the effort to protect the Negro from race discrimination.
By giving an extremely narrow interpretation to the fourteenth amend-
12 See Mr. Justice Field's opinions in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 324 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312
(1879).
13 Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); DAVID, THE HisToRy oF THE HAYMARKEr
AFFArR 375-88 (2d ed. 1958).
14 RocnE, op. cit. supra note 2.
15 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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ment, Justice Bradley (with the former slaveholder Justice Harlan alone
dissenting 6) ruled that only formal state action of a discriminatory
character fell within the amendment's interdict. Consequently, "pri-
vate" racial discrimination by railroads, theatres, hotels, and the like
,was held to be a matter within the sole jurisdiction of the states. Bradley
suggested that to rule otherwise would make the Negroes favorites of
the national government and would discriminate against white men, who
presumably were in need of equal treatment.
The Bradley opinion has to be understood as a period-piece. It was
grossly unhistorical: The framers of the fourteenth amendment were
attempting to provide constitutional certainty for the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 which penalized racial discrimination by "custom" as well as by
"law."' 7 In an ironic sense, Bradley's opinion echoed President Johnson's
veto of the Civil Rights Act, which was promptly overridden by two-thirds
of both houses of Congress.' 8 And it was Johnson's veto, and the fear that
the good work might be undone by future presidents and legislatures
where two-thirds could not be mustered, that led to the passage of the
fourteenth amendment. 19 Fundamentally, Justice Bradley declared the
fourteenth amendment, as originally conceived, to be unconstitutional.
It is worth noting that Bradley's decision here marked a sharp break
with his earlier construction of the purpose of the fourteenth amendment
and the reach of the civil rights statutes. In December, 1870, Bradley's
Circuit Judge (later Justice) William Woods wrote him at length on the
constitutional problems involved in a suit by the United States under
the Enforcement Act of May 81, 1870. An Alabama mob led by Hall, it
was charged, "did unlawfully and feloniously band and conspire together,
with intent to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate" a group of Ne-
groes "with intent to prevent and hinder their free exercise and enjoy-
ment of the right of freedom of speech" and "freedom of assembly,"
rights which were "granted and secured to them by the constitution of
the United States." Hall filed a demurrer on constitutional grounds,
claiming that "the matters charged in said counts are not in violation of
any right of privilege granted or secured" by the Constitution since
neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Civil Rights Acts could legiti-
mately penalize private action.
Woods described the situation to Bradley in detail in a letter dated
December 24, 187020: A peaceful Republican gathering of Negroes en-
16 Id. at 26.
17 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
1s See Johnson's veto message of March 27, 1886, in 6 RIcHAIWSON, MESSAGES AND
PEaRs 405 (1897).
19 McKrrmic, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 326-36 (1960).
20 The following correspondence is among the Bradley Papers in the New Jersey
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gaged in "political discussion" was broken up by a gang of armed whites
who had killed two and wounded over fifty. The authority of the state
of Alabama, however, had nowhere been involved, and Woods queried
Bradley, in essence, whether jurisdiction existed over private action as
distinct from state action. On January 3, 1871, Bradley replied that
"viewed simply as a riot, it was an offense against the municipal law only;
but viewed as a riot to intimidate persons and prevent them from exer-
cising the right of suffrage, guaranteed to them by the fifteenth amendment
to the Constitution, it was a violation [of national law]." 21 Woods was not
satisfied and again raised the subject with Bradley inquiring whether
the riot was a federal offense "when committed simply for that purpose
[to break up the Negro gathering], without any definite intent to prevent
the exercise of the right of suffrage." 22
Replying, Bradley came down vigorously in support of national juris-
diction. Writing on March 12, 1871, the Justice informed Woods that
under the fourteenth amendment Congress could protect fundamental
rights such as speech and assembly "against unfriendly or insufficient
state legislation." 23 Treating these basic rights as privileges and immuni-
ties of national citizenship, Bradley continued:
Therefore, to guard against this invasion of the citizen's
fundamental rights, and to ensure their adequate protection,
as well against state legislation as state inaction or incom-
petency, the amendment [fourteenth] gives Congress power to
enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. And as it
would be unseemly for Congress to interfere directly with state
enactments, and as it cannot compel the activity of state of-
ficials, the only appropriate legislation it can make is that which
will operate directly on offenders and offenses and protect the
rights which the amendment secures. The extent to which Con-
gress shall exercise this power must depend on its discretion in
view of the circumstances of each case. If the exercise of it in
any case should seem to interfere with the domestic affairs of a
state, it must be remembered that it is for the purpose of pro-
tecting federal rights: and these must be protected whether it
interferes with domestic laws or domestic administration of
laws.24
In May, 1871, Judge Woods issued his opinion in United States v.
Historical Society. I am indebted to C. Peter Magrath of Brown University for calling
this material to my attention. See also MAGRATH, MomRisoN R. WArrE 119-23 (1963).
21 Letter from Bradley to Woods (draft), Washington, D.C., January 3, 1871.
22 Letter from Woods to Bradley, March, 1871.
23 Letter from Bradley to Woods (draft), Washington, D.C., March 12, 1871.
24 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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Hall,25 overruling the demurrer and sustaining the jurisdiction of the
federal government under the fourteenth amendment and the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870. His views were practically identical with the formula-
tions in Bradley's letter. Freedom of speech and assembly were privileges
and immunities of national citizenship and consequently:
[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect
the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against
unfriendly or insufficient state legislation, for the fourteenth
amendment not only prohibits the making or enforcement of
laws which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen, but pro-
hibits the states from denying ... the equal protection of the
laws. Denying includes inaction as well as action, and denying
the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to pro-
tect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection. The
citizen of the United States is entitled to the enforcement of the
laws for the protection of his fundamental rights, as well as the
enactment of such laws. Therefore, to guard against the in-
vasion of the citizen's fundamental rights, and to insure their
adequate protection, as well against state legislation as state
inaction, or incompetency, the amendment gives congress the
power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. And
as it would be unseemly for congress . . . . [the remainder of
Bradley's formulation quoted above follows]. 26
Although Bradley, in a different context, endorsed this nationalizing
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause by joining the
Field dissent, and elaborated on the due process theme in his own dissent
in the Slaughter-House Cases,27 in the decade that followed he came about
full circle. As he put it to a friend, he was "seeking the truth" rather than
"dogmatically laying down opinions," 28 and beginning with his circuit
opinion in the Cruikshank case,29 he moved perceptably towards the
position, incorporated in his decision in the Civil Rights Cases,30 that
congressional power limited only formal state action. In a later comment
on one of the letters cited here he noted retrospectively that his views
"were much modified by subsequent reflection, so far as relates to the
power of Congress to pass laws for enforcing social equality between
the races." 31
25 26 Fed. Gas. 79 (No. 15,282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
26 Id. at 81-82.
27 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1872).
28 Letter from Bradley to Frederick Frelinghuysen (draft), Stowe, Vt., July 19, 1874.
29 United States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. 707 (No. 14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874).
30 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
31 Noted in letter to Frelinghuysen, supra note 28.
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"Social equality" was hardly a real issue in the 1870s; the fact of the
matter was that by 1883, the Negro had been left to his fate by Congress,
the President, and the American (white) people.32 All Justice Bradley
did was incorporate the realities of the day into the fourteenth amend-
ment. Moreover, echoes of "Black Reconstruction" can be heard in his
opinion; indeed, right down to our own time the reputation of the
Southern Reconstruction legislatures, in which the Negroes were often
manipulated by rascally "carpetbaggers," has been one featuring egre-
gious corruption. Though an objective historical observer might have
difficulty deciding whether these governments were more corrupt than
their "lily-white" successors, or than those in the northern states at the
same time,33 Bradley shared the common view that the white man had
been discriminated against by the civil rights laws with unfortunate re-
sults. He demanded fair play for the white population.
"Private acts" (though in fact they were enforced by the police power
of the state) were thus eliminated from national jurisdiction. Even the
action of a railroad, which Bradley in the Granger cases 34 had agreed was
"affected with a public interest," being in effect a quasi-public corpora-
tion, was a "private" decision so far as racial discrimination was con-
cerned. Thus a railroad became a schizophrenic entity: Some of its
decisions were public (rates and schedules, for example) and some private
(racial segregation). By these same paradoxical rules, a state law banning
racial segregation on interstate carriers was unconstitutional as a burden
on interstate commerce,3 5 while a similar law requiring segregation was
upheld as a legitimate police regulation.3 6
As it survived the Civil Rights Cases, the fourteenth amendment
limited only state action depriving individuals of due process or equal
protection of the laws. Occasionally the Court did find some state action,
for example, a law barring Negroes from juries,3 7 to be unconstitutional,
but the characteristic pattern of racial discrimination was left undisturbed
by the development of two subsidiary propositions. First, "state action"
was generally defined in a very narrow legalistic fashion as action taken
in pursuance of state law: The fact that no Negro had ever been called
to jury duty was, for example, no proof as far as the Court was con-
cerned that Negroes were being discriminated against providing no law
32 See WooDwARD, REUNION AND REACTION (1951).
33 See JOSEPHSON, ROBBER BARONS (1934); JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS (1938).
34 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
35 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
36 Chiles v. C. & 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
37 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). This was a fifteenth amendment case:
Delaware required that jurors be voters and limited the vote to whites; Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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forbade their serving on juries.3 8 Moreover, if an official act of discrimi-
nation was technically in violation of a state constitution or statute, it
was not considered "state action" on the ground that a state cannot be
held responsible for the illegal actions of its agents. 39
In the second case, the Court began in 1882 the process of redefining
"equal protection" which culminated, with Plessy v. Ferguson,40 in con-
stitutional sanction for "Jim Crow" laws in 1896. Although seldom
emphasized by commentators, the decision in Pace v. Alabama4' was in
loco parentis to the "separate but equal rule" of Plessy. At issue were
two Alabama laws: The first punishing fornication or adultery between
persons of the same race as a misdemeanor (100 dollar fine or six months
in jail); the second essentially making it a felony for persons of different
races to intermarry or live in adultery or fornication with each other
(two to seven years in jail). A Negro man and a white woman, who had
been sentenced to two years in prison, appealed their sentences on the
ground that the differential treatment prescribed by statute for inter-
racial sexual relations was state action denying them equal protection
of the laws. Note that the law penalized intermarriage on the same basis
as illicit relations.
Justice Field, for a unanimous Court, found no difficulty in sustaining
the Alabama Code. A man may have had a natural right to follow his
calling, in Field's view, but he had no equivalent right to choose his wife
free from state control. The laws under attack did not discriminate
against Negroes, observed Field, any more than they did against whites:
"The two sections of the Code cited are entirely consistent. The one
prescribes, generally, a punishment for an offense committed between
persons of different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an of-
fense which can only be committed when the two sexes are of different
races. There is in neither section any discrimination against either race."42
After all, Field concluded, both the Negro and the white woman received
the same punishment. For some reason he did not seem to feel that the
penalization of intermarriage violated "freedom of contract."
While Field's opinion was brief, its import for the future was enormous.
In less than three pages, the Justice, his eight brethren concurring, ef-
38 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). But discrimination by a state judge, even
in the absence of a statute, was held to be state action, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880).
39 See the discussion of this proposition by Frankfurter, J. dissenting in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961).
40 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
42 Id. at 585.
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fectively torpedoed the equal protection clause. Even Harlan could not
dissent in this instance; miscegenation probably hit him at his weakest
point: his fundamentally southern social and religious convictions about
the distinctiveness of the "races." 43 What Pace v. Alabama did was re-
establish the legal category "Negro"-it now became legitimate for the
states to differentiate formally between Negroes and whites as they did
between men and women, or aliens and citizens. While the purpose of
the equal protection clause had been to eliminate from American law
the category "Negro"-its authors were infuriated by the "Black Codes"
-the Court now told the states that "race" was a valid basis for dif-
ferentiation among its citizens. Of course, there were potential limits.
Under the equal protection clause every category had to be justified in
terms of its purpose: A state would have no difficulty forbidding sale of
intoxicants to minors, but would run into difficulties if sales were for-
bidden to blue-eyed citizens. There had to be, in other words, a rea-
sonable connection between the end and the means, and the category
had to be discrete.
But in the case of the category "Negro" few limitations were dis-
covered. Recall that in Pace v. Alabama the Court implicitly held that
the state could, in the effort to maintain public morality, treat marriage
between a white and a Negro as if it were adultery or fornication. In
short, the "race" of one partner could convert a lawful relationship into
a felony. Moreover, in defiance of the history of race relations in the
South, "Negro" was treated as a homogeneous category; white suprema-
cists apparently saw nothing illogical in defining as a Negro anyone with
one Negro grandparent, or great-grandparent in some states, though when
the odds get up to seven to one, some question arises as to which is the
"master race." Even when, as in Alabama, one Negro grandparent was
decisive, the category was a bit eccentric; it was rather as if a state legisla-
ture had defined a basket of apples as a basket containing at least twenty-
five per cent apples. This problem, however, never troubled either south-
ern politicians or the courts.
The southern Negro, poor and landless, "knew very well that im-
mediate, daily necessities came first-land, mules, plows, food, and
clothes, all of which had to be got from a white man who oftener than
not had too little himself. '44 Thus, in terms of the social system, the
Negro, even at the zenith of "Radical Reconstruction," never achieved
equality. From the viewpoint of the southern white community, the
Civil Rights Acts were a marginal harassment; Union troops were a
problem, but the last blue contingent went North in 1877. With the
43 As pointed out in Westin, op. cit. supra note 11, at 673.
44 WOODWvARD, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW SouTH 209 (1951).
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outlawing of "Black Codes," informal measures of social control, which
were no less effective because informal, were utilized to the same end.
Then, in the late '80s and early '90s, began the flood of "Jim Crow"
legislation, laws based on the principle enunciated in Pace v. Alabama
that Negroes were different from whites and that this distinction justified
differential treatment. Curiously, as Professor C. Vann Woodward has
noted, "the barriers of racial discrimination mounted in direct ratio with
the tide of political democracy among whites. In fact, an increase of
Jim Crow laws upon the statute books of a state is almost an accurate
index of the decline of the reactionary regimes of the Redeemers and
triumph of white democratic movements." 45 The Redeemers had used
the Negroes as pawns in their maintenance of political power; now the
Negroes were to be punished for their cardinal sin-helplessness.
The classic "Jim Crow" law was an enactment requiring racial segrega-
tion in railroad and tram cars. In order to understand the importance
of the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,46 which provided
the constitutional foundation for racial discrimination until 1954, let us
review the principle involved. When a state required that railroads pro-
vide facilities for whites and Negroes on a separate basis, it was establish-
ing a classification on the basis of "race." For this classification to be
sustained in the face of the equal protection clause, it had to be demon-
strated that separation based on "race" was a reasonable method of at-
taining a legitimate legislative goal: the maintenance of public health,
morals and welfare. Assuming for purposes of argument that some
special "scientific" rationale could be introduced to justify laws against
intermarriage, there would be no necessary carryover to transportation.
One can require, for example, that men and women use different dressing
rooms at the beach without insisting that they swim at different places.
In short, the emotionally charged problem of sexual relations present in
Pace v. Alabama was absent in Plessy v. Ferguson. If the Court sustained
the statute, it would be hard to conceive of any social, economic or
political relationship in which segregation could not be legally required.
In 1890, Louisiana passed a "Jim Crow" transportation law. One
Homer Adolph Plessy was arrested for attempting to enter the coach
reserved for whites and refusing to leave when ordered to do so. There
is an air of unreality about the whole episode: Plessy was one-eighth
Negro and insisted that he was "white." Like his French contemporary
Captain Dreyfus, who was something of an anti-Semite, Plessy was
hardly a fighter for the rights of man. The Louisiana courts declared
him a Negro and he challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
45 Id. at 211.
46 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Dividing seven to one, the Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana enact-
ment.
Justice Henry B. Brown wrote the opinion of the Court. Early in his
statement, he put the holding in a nutshell: "A statute which implies
merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races ...has
no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races .. ..,47 After
examining precedents and noting that the state legislatures must be
permitted a large area of reasonable discretion in their police power
enactments-a latitude, it might be recalled, the Court was reluctant to
grant in the economic sphere-Brown came to the heart of his opinion.
The whole difficulty, he averred, arose from Negro hypersensitivity:
We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument to con-
sist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.48
As the dincher to this argument, Brown observed that if the Negroes
controlled state legislatures and passed "precisely similar" enactments,
white men would not feel they had been assigned an inferior position.
This brings us to Brown's sociology which needs to be set out at some
length in his own words:
The argument [against the segregation statute] also assumes
that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that
equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an en-
forced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this
proposition. If the two races are to meet on terms of social
equality, it must be the result of mutual affinities, a mutual
appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial in-
stincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences.
... If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race
be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them on the same plane.49
Although it might have come as a shock to Justice Brown, this opinion
is an interesting theoretical statement; on a practical and somewhat
47t Id. at 543.
48 Id. at 551.
49 Id. at 551-52. (Emphasis added.) Concretely, Brown thus held the statute to be a
not unreasonable technique of foreclosing social conflict and maintaining the public
peace.
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foggy level, it was a combination of the leading scientific views of the
time with Aristotle's conception of proportional equality.
It was in precisely this period that racial theories reached their apogee
in the United States; among biologists, sociologists and social anthro-
pologists as well as journalists and political commentators, the assump-
tions of Baron Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain-that races were
discrete entities and that the white or "Caucasian" race was superior to
the others-were taken for granted. The southern politician, of course,
needed no lofty theoretical justification for white supremacy-he knew
what he wanted and really did not care how the scientists, journalists
or Supreme Court Justices rationalized his attainment of racial segrega-
tion. But the better elements in the community needed a respectable
intellectual base to justify discrimination, and the "social science" of the
time supplied the requisite foundation.50
Negroes, then, were biologically different from whites, essentially
members of a different species, set apart by their "racial instincts." Thus,
in the same fashion that an intelligent zoo keeper separates the lions
and the elephants in different compounds, the Supreme Court endorsed
the proposition that biologically distinct Negroes and whites need not
be given identical treatment. What was good for Negroes was not neces-
sarily good for whites, any more than a lion would necessarily thrive on
an elephant's diet. Fundamental to this view, though not explicit in
Brown's opinion, was the further corollary that the whites were more
advanced, more "civilized," than the Negroes, that they were several
stages higher in the evolutionary scale. Incidently, this "science" also
supplied a good genetic rationale for anti-miscegenation laws. As late
as 1955 the Virginia Supreme Court justified an anti-miscegenation
statute as an effort to "preserve the racial integrity" of the state's in-
habitants and to "regulate the marriage relation so that it will not have
a mongrel breed of citizens." 51
Once the proposition that Negroes were in essence a distinct biological
category had been established (by ipse dixit), the principle of propor-
tional equality could come into play. Equality, according to Aristotle
and a steady stream of theorists since, is treatment according to merits
or desserts. For Aristotle, however, a man's merits were a function of his
potentialities, not of the color of his skin or the color of one great-
grandparent's skin. Now merit became a function of membership in a
racial category, and the "Negro Race" had no claim to treatment in the
laws of the United States identical with that accorded members of the
50 See Sprrz, PATTERNs OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 137-62 (1948).
51 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756, vacated and remanded, 350 U.S.
891 (1955), reaffirmed, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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"Caucasian Race." While the analogy is perhaps banal, recall that the
zoo keeper does not "discriminate" against the elephant when he feeds
him hay instead of the red meat beloved by lions. On this basis, Justice
Brown could blandly and quite sincerely state that segregated treatment
for Negroes was only a consequence of their distinctiveness and was in
no way a "badge of inferiority." Only a psychotic elephant would com-
plain because he got no steak.
Justice Harlan wrote what many consider his finest dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson. It is an interesting opinion because Harlan subscribed
completely to the "Negro Race" theory, but refused to admit the rele-
vance of this "social science" to American constitutional law. "The white
race," said Harlan, "deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power. So, I doubt not that it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty." 52 The Constitution, Harlan thundered, "is color-blind"; the
former colonel of Kentucky volunteers in Lincoln's army effectively
charged the Court with overruling the verdict of Appomattox. He as-
serted bluntly that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott Case."53 The nub of his position was that the Court had con-
fused social with constitutional equality-the first was not at issue in
the case, he said, since
[S]ocial equality no more exists between two races when travel-
ing in a passenger coach or a public highway than when mem-
bers of the same race sit by each other in a street car ....
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. ....
But by the statute in question a Chinaman can ride in the same
passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while
citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps,
risked their lives for the preservation of the Union ... are yet
declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in
a public coach occupied by citizens of the white race. 54
"Every true man has pride of race," observed the Justice, "but I deny
that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race
of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved."55
Equal protection of the laws was in this fashion glossed by the Supreme
52 163 U.S. at 559.
53 Ibid.
54 Id. at 561.
55 Id. at 554.
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Court to eliminate juridical equality of Negroes; essentially a state ful-
filled the requirements of the fourteenth amendment if it treated all
whites equally, all Negroes equally and granted "substantial equality"
to Negroes vis-2t-vis whites. The Court's holding unloosed a flood of "Jim
Crow" lawmaking in all the southern, and even some of the northern,
states, a flood which ended by submerging every aspect of day to day life
under the protocol of segregation. As C. Vann Woodward has shown,
some ingenious legislator in one state would devise a new law, providing
segregation coverage for some area theretofore overlooked, and it would
rapidly spread from state to state in a wave of mimicry.50 It seems to
have become a species of nasty game-and one totally lacking a logical
rationale. The same Negro woman who prepared a white family's meals
and all but raised its children would be compelled to use the "Colored"
drinking fountain, the "Colored" wash rooms and sit in the back of the
trolley to keep the white population uncontaminated. But few attempted
to defend the system logically, and it did seem to keep the "Red Necks,"
or the "Crackers"-the poor rural whites-happy and secure in a status
at least one notch above the bottom.
The Negroes were in neither position nor mood to fight back. Their
greatest leader, Booker T. Washington, the Negro prototype of Horatio
Alger, was a conciliator who urged his fellows to accept the limitations
established by the white community and work within them. Washington
has been accused by later Negro leaders of being an "Uncle Tom," a
cringing suppliant at the white man's table, but the more one studies
those terrible years, the more he wonders what alternative Washington
had if he wanted to stay in the South. There is a curious parallel here
between Washington jand Samuel Gompers of the American Federation
of Labor, who was likewise condemned by impatient radicals as a "class
collaborationist": When the odds against success reach a certain point,
there is often a need for the courage to refuse to be drawn into a fight.
So Washington accepted apartheid and set to work at Tuskegee Institute
to develop a Negro elite, men who hopefully in the next generation
could provide the anomic Negro community with leadership of a dif-
ferent sort than that supplied by preachers, who tended to be the foci
of existing social organization. As Washington appraised the situation,
the alternative to appeasement was the lynch mob and the race riot,
and the events of those years should lead anyone to pause before pro-
nouncing a malediction on the man and his message.
Indeed, a case can be made that from the viewpoint of the Negro, the
picture got worse rather than better as the United States moved into the
twentieth century. For one thing, perhaps under the impact of the racial
56 WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF" JIM CROW (rev. ed. 1957).
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dogmas which were so popular, the number of white men who were con-
cerned about the cause of Negro rights went into decline after the Civil
War. As the old radicals-Charles Sumner, Wendell Philips, George W.
Julian, William Lloyd Garrison--died, there were no replacements. The
reductio ad absurdam probably came in 1903 when the program of the
Louisiana Socialist Party came out for "separation of the black and
white races into separate communities, each race to have charge of its
own affairs." 7 Eugene Victor Debs, the tribune of American socialism,
rejected this leftwing version of apartheid in favor of full equality, but
the Socialists put little emphasis on race problems; the latter were merely
manifestations of a fundamental social malaise and could be eliminated
only at the source, by transforming the United States from a capitalist
oligarchy into a socialist cooperative commonwealth. 5s
A second cause of Negro discouragement was the spread of southern
white racial mores into the North and West, a phenomenon which ac-
celerated with World War I and the concomitant exodus of Negroes
from southern farms to northern factories, or to service jobs in factory
towns. The early years of the new century were racked by a series of
savage race riots; significantly they took place in cities on both sides of
the Mason-Dixon Line, the two worst being in Atlanta (1906) and Spring-
field, Illinois (1908). According to John Hope Franklin, more than a
hundred Negroes were lynched in the first year of the century and "be-
fore the outbreak of World War I the number ... had soared to more
than 1100. ' 59 Symptomatic of the rising pressure was the Kentucky
legislature's assault in 1904 on Berea College and other unsegregated
private schools in the state. The legislative instinct was probably sound.
Berea, with its abolitionist heritage, was precisely the sort of school where
able young Negroes could get the wrong ideas; and in an untheoretical
way, the legislature moved to suppress a source of ideological infection
in the Negro community. Let the colored youngsters go to agricultural
schools on a segregated basis, but keep them out of a mixed intellectual
atmosphere dedicated to Christian principles. The legislators may have
reflected that Christianity had been subversive on occasions.
Berea College was fined 1000 dollars for violating the 1904 statute, and
in 1908 the case came before the United States Supreme Court for final
determination. The right of the states to segregate public educational
facilities had been covertly sustained by Harlan for the Court in 1899
in Cumming v. Board of Education.60 In meticulous legal terms, Harlan
57 Cited in KIPNIs, THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT, 1897-1912, 131 (1952).
58 Id. at 131-36.
59 FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY To FREEDoM 432 (1947).
60 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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ducked the substantive issue: The validity of "separate but equal" edu-
cational institutions, he observed lamely, was not raised in the pleadings
and was therefore not before the Court.61 In fact, it does not appear that
Harlan considered integrated schools as part of the civil rights package.
If he had, one can predict that he would have gotten to the merits over
any number of technical, procedural hurdles. 62 The practical consequence
of the Gumming case was a de facto validation of public school segrega-
tion. But in Berea College v. Kentucky,63 the situation was different in
Harlan's eyes, though not in the view of his judicial brethren, who dis-
posed of the litigation on a narrow basis.
Berea College was a decision with interesting dimensions. In the first
place, Berea argued that the Kentucky statute deprived it of the corporate
right to do business on its own terms, that is, Berea invoked the blessing
of the spirit of entrepreneurial liberty. Indeed, counsel for Berea relied
heavily on both In re Jacobs64 and Lochner v. New York6 5 to support
their contention that the Kentucky enactment was not really a police
power action, but was an encroachment on contractual freedom disguised
as a police measure. But while the lawyers did a noble job of trying to
fit the case within the vested rights tradition-they even cited Dart-
mouth College66-Justice David Brewer suddenly developed a deep af-
fection for the police power. He flatly refused to examine the constitu-
tional issue of equal protection, ruling merely that Kentucky was within
its rights in altering corporate charters. 67 Justice Holmes and Moody
concurred in the judgment, Justice Day dissented without opinion, and
Justice Harlan loosed his thunderbolts in a vivid, caustic dissent. This
time Harlan brushed away the procedural difficulties as so much ir-
relevant fluff and struck at the heart of the matter.
The Kentucky law, said Harlan, deeply distressed and angered by this
action in his beloved Commonwealth, was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the right of private association and of the equal protection
clause. Moreover, Harlan, a deeply religious man (he objected to the
Chicago World's Fair being open on Sunday),68 felt that the decision of
the Court would justify a state in laying "unholy hands on the religious
61 Id. at 541.
62 See Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes,
66 YALE L.J. 637, 689 (1957).
63 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
64 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
65 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
67 211 U.S. at 57.
68 Westin, supra note 62, at 639.
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faith of the people."'69 If a state could tamper in this fashion with the
inner life of a religiously sponsored corporation, "white and colored
children may even be forbidden to sit together in a house of worship or
at a communion table in the same Christian church." "Have we become
so inoculated with prejudice of race," he asked, "that an American gov-
ernment, professedly based on the principles of freedom, and charged
with the protection of all citizens alike, can make [racial] distinctions in
the matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes"?70 The
answer given by his associates, and by the American people was clearly
"Yes."
These decisions offer a good insight into the operation of the Ameri-
can constitutional process. Two Supreme Court holdings-Pace v. Ala-
bama and Plessy v. Ferguson-dealt squarely with the merits of state
segregation laws. Yet the Court's rulings in these cases, particularly in the
Plessy case, were by extrapolation used to validate the whole structure of
"Jim Crow." The fundamental question-whether state enforced segrega-
tion violates the equal protection clause-was not (with one area of ex-
ception) reexamined by the Supreme Court until the 1940s and 1950s.
Thus, while lawyers are technically within their guild prerogatives when
they assert that a Supreme Court decision is only a determination of the
case at bar, the Justices in one "limited" holding (enforced segregation in
transportation does not violate the equal protection of the laws), Plessy
v. Ferguson, in social and institutional terms gave their imprimatur to
the whole structure of white supremacy. In other words, the Plessy opin-
ion was a monumental piece of judicial legislation. In fact, the Supreme
Court effectively amended the Constitution of the United States by re-
writing the fourteenth amendment.
The problem of Negro suffrage arising under the fifteenth amendment
was disposed of in parallel fashion; the Court in this period allowed the
amendment, designed to guarantee the voting rights of the freedmen, to
become virtually a dead letter. The states achieved Negro disfranchise-
ment by a number of devices-literacy tests, payment of poll taxes, prop-
erty qualifications, inter alia-but most effective of all was the "white
primary." Political parties barred Negroes from membership and par-
ticipation in primary elections, and the Court sustained this technique
by holding parties to be "private" organizations beyond the reach of
federal power.71 Only in 191172 was a beginning made towards employing
69 211 U.S. at 68.
70 Ibid.
71 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
72 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). The anti-peonage statute had earlier been
sustained against charges of unconstitutionality, Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905).
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the thirteenth amendment to end the labor contract peonage system
which held many rural Negroes in virtual slavery. As far as the Negro
was concerned, the Civil War had altered his juridical status, but not his
basic relationship to the power structure.
In only one area was the authority of the states circumscribed: when
racial legislation flagrantly conflicted with the dogmas of entrepreneurial
liberty. Justice Field set the precedent here when he and his associates
on the Ninth Judicial Circuit in the 1880s declared war on the anti-
Asian enactments of the WAest Coast states. The classic instance was the
Parrott case 73 in which the federal circuit court in San Francisco de-
clared unconstitutional a provision of the California Constitution of
1879 which forbade corporations to employ Chinese. While in this and
similar instances, the net effect was to bestow protection on the helpless
Chinese, the gravamen of the decision was clearly that the proviso in
question violated entrepreneurial liberty, the employer's right to hire
at his discretion. In 1886, in a decision anticipating Lochner v. New
York,74 Justice Matthews held that a San Francisco ordinance, allegedly
a fire prevention measure, which eliminated wooden laundries was in
fact designed to drive Chinese laundrymen out of business and thus
violated the equal protection dause.75 Justice Field, an intimate of the
great corporate figures in California who had imported the Chinese to
undercut the local (unionized) labor market, took these aliens under his
personal protection. He and his loyal circuit and district judges struck
down on one ground or another any police power enactment which
seemed to be part of the "Chinese Must GO!" campaign sponsored by
the Union Labor Party and its "sand lot" allies. 76
In the Berea College case, it will be recalled, counsel for the college
attempted to call up the spirit of entrepreneurial liberty from the murky
deep. Their incantation, which included the magic words Jacobs and
Lochner, was, however, a dismal failure. But in 1917, this formula did
demonstrate its potency, and under its aegis certain property rights were
excised from the sway of "separate but equal." In 1914 the city of
Louisville, Kentucky, in order to "prevent conflict and ill-feeling between
the white and colored races" zoned certain districts for Negro inhabita-
tion and others for whites. By employing some quite complicated legal
techniques which need not detain us here, a test case was brought to the
Supreme Court which unanimously ruled that the municipal ordinance
73 In re Tribucio Parrott, 1 Fed. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
74 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
75 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
76 See Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851,
881-88 (1943), for an account of Field's special dispensations for the Chinese.
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violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.77 Justice
Day distinguished Plessy v. Ferguson and stated that the issue here was
not the right of a state to classify legitimately its citizens by race. In his
words:
The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit
the amalgamation of the races. The right which the ordinance
annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his
property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color, and of a
colored person to make such disposition to a white person.
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the prop-
erty in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of
the fundamental law . . . preventing state interference with
property rights except by due process of law.78
In practical terms, this did not, of course, open up housing to Negroes
in white districts; whites took recourse to restrictive covenants, private
stipulations not to sell to Negroes or other "undesirable" ethnic groups
which ran with property and were, until 1948, enforceable at law. What
the decision did demonstrate was that in the event of dear conflict be-
tween ideologies, entrepreneurial liberty was even more sacrosanct than
racism.
Let us turn now from the civil rights of racial minorities to the prob-
lems of the spokesmen for the economic and political underdogs, the
Socialists and the trade unionists. It should perhaps be emphasized that
relatively few of the issues here ever reached the stratospheric level of
Supreme Court adjudication. What we can attempt to convey is the
atmosphere of the era and examine the few cases that did reach the top
of the judicial pyramid. The first thing that has to be visualized is the
tradition of direct action which played so striking a role in industrial
relations. With effective legal techniques of unionization crippled by
judicial roadblocks (particularly the inevitable injunction), it was not
surprising that determined, militant unionists, usually 6f Socialist
persuasion, turned to violence to defend what they considered their
rights. The employers, with their private armies, played rough, and in
members of an organization like the Industrial Workers of the World
(IArw) they found men who were ready to meet them on their own
ground.
From roughly 1890 to the end of World War I an industrial civil war
raged intermittently in the mining states of the West. On one side
77 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
78 Id. at 81-82.
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was the Western Federation of Miners, later to become a sponsor of the
IWW, and on the other, the gradually consolidating mine owners, de-
termined to break the power which the union had established in the
early days.7 9 The owners, mostly absentee, were exposed to problems
in the West which they had seldom encountered in the eastern mines.
First, in mining areas the population was almost totally committed to
the union cause and characteristically elected pro-union men to local
office-the sheriff and the town marshal were rarely "reliable" and
elected judges too could create unforeseen problems. Second, there were
few available strikebreakers in the isolated western communities. Third,
virtually everyone possessed arms and experts with high explosives were
a dime a dozen; industrial conflict was punctuated with dynamite blasts:
In 1899, at the famous "Battle of Bunker Hill & Sullivan" in the Coeur
d'Alenes, ninety cases of dynamite (4,500 pounds) were used by the VVFM
to obliterate one of the largest ore concentrators in the country. ("It
went up like an umbrella," one of the union leaders remarked.)80
Any campaign to break the union had to be prepared on military
lines: Strikebreakers had to be imported, militia from nonmining sec-
tions of the states mobilized, and local judges and officials neutralized.
And the WFM had its covert allies: At least one large shipment of
"scabs" bound for southern Idaho was deposited in Oregon by railroad
unionists. The injunction, that old standby in the East, was a complete
flop. The western equivalent was martial law. This is hardly the place
to chronicle the thirty years' war which ended with the defeat and sup-
pression of the WFM in its old strongholds; this story has been told with
meticulous care by Vernon JensenSl and the dimensions of violence have
been vividly etched by Stewart Holbrook.8 2
What is important here is the total absence of any tradition of civil
rights, the willingness on both sides to utilize illegal techniques. The
derailing of a trainload of "scabs," or the murder of a company "fink"
by the WFM goonsquad, brought almost as much joy to the heart of a
hard-rock miner as the deportation of five hundred union stalwarts into
the reaches of the desert did to a mine owner. Two quotations will re-
inforce this point. In 1904 the Cripple Creek district of Colorado ex-
ploded when the mine owners, who had advertised for labor as far away
as Duluth, moved in strikebreakers and locked out the WFM. After
various sanguinary events, Governor Peabody declared Teller County
to be in rebellion and proclaimed martial law.
79 See JENSEN, HERITAGE OF CONFLIcT (1950).
80 See HOLBROOK, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REVOLUTION 34-41 (1956).
81 JENSEN, Op. cit. supra note 79.
82 HOLBROOK, Op. cit. supra note 80.
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The local police were deposed. National Guardsmen were set
to patrolling all the towns. Citizens were ordered to bring in
their arms. . . . The Western Federation hurriedly got out a
handbill and distributed it throughout the district. It was a
message from Federation President Moyer: "I strongly advise
every member to provide himself with the latest improved rifle
.. so that in two years we can hear the inspiring music of the
martial tread of 25,000 armed men in the ranks of labor."83
All union leaders were hastily arrested by military authority
and as promptly demanded their constitutional right to habeas
corpus. "Habeas corpus be damnedl" replied General Bell of
the National Guard. "We'll give 'em post-mortems" 8 4
In the long run, the mine owners, with the federal army at their
disposal in real crises, in other words, when the state militia were un-
reliable, could not lose. They were wards of the state, and if the state
did not fulfill its obligations to entrepreneurial liberty, or wavered, they
took direct action to guarantee their prerogatives. In 1904, when the
liberal Democrat Alva Adams defeated Peabody in the gubernatorial
election in Colorado, the mine owners immediately moved to block him
from office and in 1905 convinced the legislature to install his defeated
opponent 8 5
The WFM was a well organized union and its men thought of them-
selves as "aristocrats of labor" and prided themselves on their courage
and skill. By comparison the migratory agricultural workers of the West
were a disorganized horde of peons, but it was this depressed constit-
uency which the "Wobblies" (IWW) set out to organize. IWW
organizers, or "job delegates" as they called themselves, were very bad in-
surance risks; if the private police of the "ranchers" did not catch up
with them, the sheriff generally did. They lived their lives in the shadow
of the noose, either private or public. As might be surmised, they were
seldom models of gentlemanly decorum. A classic "Wobbly" handbill
gives the atmosphere: "Don't put copper tacks in fruit trees! It kills
them!" This was passed out in fruit country along with bags of copper
tacks.8 6
The "Wheatland Riot" of 1913 is a good example of the impact of
83 Id. at 104.
84.1d. at 106. See the judicial fallout from this episode in Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78 (1909), in which Holmes sustained the Governor's action.
85 JENSEN, Op. cit. supra note 79, at 155-59.
86 I am grateful to my colleague Professor Ray Ginger of Brandeis University for
calling this item to my attention.
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civil rights doctrines at the grassroots. Let us quote from Stuart
Jamieson's authoritative study:
Following a practice not unusual among large-scale growers,
E. B. Durst, hop rancher, had advertised in newspapers through-
out California and Nevada for some 2,700 workers. He subse-
quently admitted that he could provide employment for only
about 1,500, and that living arrangements were inadequate even
for that number.... A great number had no bedding and slept
on piles of straw thrown on floors, in tents rented from Durst
at 75 cents a week; many slept in the fields. There were no facili-
ties for sanitation or garbage disposal and only 9 outdoor toilets
for 2,800 people; dysentary became prevalent. . . The water
wells were insufficient ... workers were forced to buy what sup-
plies they could afford from a concession store on the ranch...
[and Durst paid lower wages] because of the surplus labor he had
recruited ... [which] were further reduced by the requirement
of extra "dean" picking.8 7
Into this appalling environment came a "Wobbly" organizer, Blackie
Ford, who led a spontaneous demonstration against Durst demanding
decent sanitary conditions and a fair wage. Durst, who attended the
meeting, agreed to discuss issues with a grievance committee and
promised to install adequate toilet facilities and supply water to the
workers in the fields (whose only thirst quencher to that date had been
lemonade at five cents a glass, sold by Durst's cousin). When Durst failed
to fulfill his commitments, another meeting was called in a hired hall in
Wheatland which was "invaded by a band of armed deputies who came
to arrest Ford."88 The meeting, which had been peaceable to that point,
turned into a riot when one of the deputies fired an intimidating shot
"to quiet the mob." Four were killed and many injured in the melee, and
then, in Jamieson's words:
Hysteria apparently gripped the authorities. . . .Mass arrests.
of "wobblies" or sympathizers were carried out. Many of the ar-
rested men were severely beaten or tortured, and many others
were held incommunicado for weeks. Ford and Suhr, the two
leading I.W.W. organizers in the camp, were convicted of murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment."89
While this sort of open warfare was going on in the West, things were
also going badly for the "conservative" wing of the labor movement,
those in the organization dismissed by the IWW as the "American
87 JAMIESON, LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 61-62 (1945).




Fakeration of Labor." I have already examined in previous articles the
devastating impact of the injunction on organizing campaigns and the
problems of the Danbury Hatters.90 Recall that in the Hitchman case 9'
the district judge had forbidden union organizers even to discuss the case
for the United Mine Workers with the employees of Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. This stringent limitation on freedom of speech was upheld by
Justice Pitney with no apparent qualms. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.92 and Gompers v. United States,93 Samuel Gompers and the
top leaders of the American Federation of Labor were found guilty of
contempt of court essentially for acting like trade union leaders.
There must have been times when Gompers felt like wiring the
Western Federation of Miners for some dynamite. In the Bucks Stove
case, the AFL had responded to a plea for assistance from the Iron
Molder's local in St. Lduis by putting the company on its "We Don't
Patronize" list, published in the monthly magazine, The American
Federationist. The Bucks Stove Co., supported by the American Anti-
Boycott Association which had financed Loewe and Fuchs' legal assault
on the Danbury Hatters, asked a federal judge for an injunction against
virtually the whole trade union movement and the nine members of
the AFL Executive Council to terminate the boycott. The judge promptly
responded by enjoining the AFL from combining to injure the com-
pany's business and in particular from publishing any printed matter
which listed Bucks Stove on an "Unfair" or "We Don't Patronize" list.
The AFL appealed immediately.
The technical aspects of the case got very complex at this point. The
injunction was not to go into effect for five days, and during that period
the AFL leadership hastily rushed another issue of the American
Federationist, featuring the Bucks Stove Co., into print. This brought
a new lawsuit, this time for contempt of court; Bucks Stove charged that
the rushed printing of the magazine and several public speeches by
Gompers and others were in violation of the injunction. On December
23, 1908, Judge Wright agreed and sentenced Gompers to a year in jail,
John Mitchell, President of the UMW, to six months and Frank Mor-
rison, editor of the American Federationist, to nine months. This too
was appealed, and thus there were two lawsuits moving up the appellate
ladder.
90 Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LABoR HIsToRY
3 (1963); Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
680 (1963).
91 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
92 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
93 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
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It would be a labyrinthine task to trace the litigation fully. From a
political viewpoint, it would appear that the Supreme Court was not
overjoyed by Judge Wright's militance. It may be doubted whether the
Justices wanted to see the top leadership of the AFL consigned to
federal prison. Justice Lamar devised a splendid face saver by upholding
the substance of Judge Wright's action and voiding the procedures
employed. Wright, who was thus given another chance, promptly-this
time with appropriate legal rites-reimposed the sentences. Once again
an appeal went up the line; the body was soon back on the Supreme
Court's doorstep. This time Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., took charge of
its disposal, and, by ingeniously inventing a statute of limitations ap-
plicable to contempt proceedings, sustained Judge Wright but freed the
defendants.
Gompers did not go to jail, but the Court did sustain the injunction.
To the argument that the injunction was an unconstitutional limita-
tion on freedom of speech and a prior restraint of the press, the Justices
were unresponsive. In concrete terms, this made possible injunctions
which would prevent a trade unionist from saying or publishing any-
thing of a derogatory character (which might hinder business) about a
nonunion firm. Entrepreneurial liberty dearly ranked above the first
amendment on the Court's scale of constitutional priorities.
This somewhat mordant narrative may provoke the question: Were
there any civil rights protected by the Constitution? Once the fourteenth
amendment had been destroyed as an instrument for nationalizing basic
"natural rights," the answer was that an individual's civil rights were
those respected by a jury of his neighbors. There were some who argued
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to
enforce on the states the same procedural requirements-e.g., grand
jury indictment, twelve man petty jury with requirement of unanimity
for conviction, privilege against self-incrimination, etc.-that the Bill
of Rights imposed on the national government. It is historically doubtful
whether the Committee of Fourteen which drafted the amendment had
precisely this in mind, though one can assert with confidence that they
intended to impose certain principles of "natural justice" on the states.
However, the intention of the Committee of Fourteen, whatever it
may have been, became completely irrelevant when in a series of
decisions the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as a meaningful limitation on state
procedures in criminal prosecutions. (The Justices were a bit more finicky
about civil actions, in which valuable property was often involved.94) In
94 See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), where the Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporated the fifth
amendment's requirement of "just compensation."
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Hurtado v. California,95 the issue was California's right in a capital case
to substitute indictment by information, a streamlined technique in
which the state's attorney filed criminal indictments directly with a
judge, for the traditional grand jury process. Hurtado claimed that
California could not deny him a grand jury without violating the federal
guarantee of due process. In reply, Justice Matthews lauded the dynamic
flexibility of American law and its adaptability to new needs and an-
nounced that the fourteenth amendment could not be construed to put
the states in a procedural straitjacket. He issued the customary maledic-
tion of unlimited state power:
[I]t is not to be supposed that these legislative powers [to alter
traditional legal procedures] are absolute and despotic, and that
the amendment prescribing due process of law is too vague and
indefinite to operate as a practical restraint.9 6
And he concluded by upholding the California procedure as a valid
experiment well within the spirit of due process.
Subsequently the Court took the same position in a number of cases,
holding for example, that Utah could cut the petty jury down to
eight 97 and that New Jersey could impair the right against self-
incrimination. 98 Justice Harlan invariably dissented in cases of this sort,
asserting indomitably that the fourteenth amendment had been intended
to impose precise procedural checks on state action.99 It is interesting to
note that whatever abstract potentialities Justice Matthews may have seen
in the due process clause as a "practical restraint," no state criminal
procedure was held to violate the fourteenth amendment in the period
covered in this study.
In fairness to the Justices, one should make the effort to see the world
through their eyes. From this vantage point, it is probable that the
decisions endorsing "liberty of contract" were seen as major contributions
95 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
96 Id. at 535;
97 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
98 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
99 See Harlan's dissents in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). There
were two levels of argument which should be distinguished. One was that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposed traditional common-law pro-
cedures on the states; the other that the due process and privileges and immunities
clauses "incorporated" the Bill of Rights in toto as a check on the states. Justice
Harlan began with the first position in Hurtado and switched to the far broader sec-
ond view in Maxwell v. Dow. See Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140, 146-57
(1949).
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to "civil rights." It also seems probable that the Income Tax'0 0 decision
was considered by its authors to be a lasting blow in the eternal struggle
to preserve liberty from tyrants. Briefly the background was this: In
1894 when the Democratic administration and Congress set out to lower
tariffs, they agreed that the decrease anticipated in customs revenue
should be compensated for by what amounted to a two per cent tax on
incomes over 4,000 dollars. While the tariff was not significantly dropped,
the tax was enacted over bitter protests that it was a confiscatory, socialist
piece of class legislation. Judge John F. Dillon, one of the outstanding
leaders of the American bar, considered the tax:
a forced contribution from the rich for the benefit of the poor
... a means of distributing the rich man's property among the
rest of the community . . . class legislation of the most pro-
nounced and vicious type . . . violative of the constitutional
rights of the property owner, subversive of the existing social
polity, and essentially revolutionary.10 1
This subversive measure was, it should be recalled, a flat (not progres-
sive) tax of two per cent on most income, with all those who annually re-
ceived less than 4,000 dollars (roughly equivalent to 25,000 dollars today)
exempt; one can wonder what Judge Dillon would think of the annual
communication that the American citizen today receives from the In-
ternal Revenue Service. A minute proportion of the American people
were affected by it; in 1891 a report of the United States Commissioner
of Labor, based on 1890 census figures, indicated that the average annual
money income of city wage and clerical workers in nine basic industries
was 573 dollars; average monthly farm wages in 1894 were $12.50 with
board, $18.50 without board, or sixty-five to eighty-five cents a day if that
was the basis of computation. 10 2
As Arnold M. Paul has chronided,103 the entrepreneurial community
and its great legal sepoys became convinced that if the income tax were
sustained by the courts, American liberty would be in dire peril and an
almost unbelievably complex course of litigation was launched. The tax,
in the view of its enemies, was dearly unconstitutional, but the con-
stitutional basis for this certainty was rather misty. Skilled lawyers set
to work to demonstrate to the Supreme Court that when the answer is
so obvious, there must be some good constitutional formulations which
will evoke it. In a classic and much quoted summation before the Court,
100 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aflirmance upheld on re-
hearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
101 Cited in PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RuLE OF LAiv 164 (1960).
102 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNrrED STATES 181, 281 (1960).
103 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 101, at 159-84.
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Joseph H. Choate called the tax by its rightful name: "Communistic."
Like Horatio and his stalwart Romans, the Justices had to hold the bridge
against this "communistic march" and vindicate the rights of private
property. To help the Court find a constitutional foothold, Choate and
his associates elaborated some distinctions in the federal taxing power
that would have turned a medieval scholastic green with envy. The es-
sence of their argument was that the income tax was a "direct tax" in
the constitutional meaning and therefore had to be apportioned among
the states by population.
The Supreme Court took two formal hearings of the case in 1895
before it could reach a conclusive determination of all the issues involved.
After the second, it decided by a five-to-four majority that the whole tax
(which involved different provisions for various forms of income) was
unconstitutional. 104 Although in historical terms the best definition of
a "direct tax" was one either on polls (a capitation) or on land, and all
others were "indirect" or excises, Chief Justice Fuller accepted Choate's
line of reasoning: The tax on the income from real and personal property
was ruled a tax on the property itself, hence "direct." Justice Harlan
vented a furious dissent which led to his being accused of endorsing the
"Marx gospel." Waving his finger under the Chief Justice's nose,
Harlan accused the majority of participating in a "judicial revolution
which may sow the seeds of hate and distrust among the people."' 105 But
the "communists" were short one Justice; the Constitution had to be
amended before the income tax could again be instituted.
At any rate, the civil right not to pay an income tax was given a
ringing endorsement; entrepreneurial liberty was preserved from the
spoliation of the majority. As Justice Field, still ferocious though seventy-
nine years old and dose to retirement, remarked in his concurring
opinion, the Constitution had to be protected from the masses. If this
"usurpation" were upheld, Field said, the income tax would be the
camel's nose under the tent:
The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It
will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweep-
ing, till our political contests will become a war of the poor
against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and
bitterness. 0 6
The Income Tax case, decided in the same year as In re Debs 0 7 and the
104 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), affirmance upheld on
rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
105 158 U.S. at 665.
106 158 U.S. at 601.
107 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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Sugar Trust case, 108 contributed to precisely the eventuality that Field
dreaded: In the presidential campaign of 1896, William Jennings Bryan,
one of the congressional sponsors of the income tax, launched a bitter
attack on the Court as a fortress of oligarchy, and demanded that judicial
authority be curbed. 109
Two other problems, which would be discussed today under the
heading of "civil liberties," also came before the Court and deserve
mention here. The first is important as showing how far Congress, the
President and the courts were prepared to go in suppressing local
practices which offended national morality. For this reason the rigorous
employment of the mailed fist against the hapless Mormons provides
an interesting contrast with the laissez faire attitude towards southern
state governments. It is true that the Mormons involved were living in
territories, not states, and might thus be considered more directly sub-
ject to national power than the white supremacists, but it is submitted
that in the appropriate context of the fourteenth amendment this
distinction is fictitious. State actions in the South enforcing racial dis-
crimination were constitutional because they were quite "moral"; ter-
ritorial actions in Utah condoning "plural marriage" were just plain bad.
The reasons that Mormon polygamy aroused such fierce antagonism must
be left to the social psychiatrist; the fact is that no effort was spared to
wipe out polygamous Mormonism. Indeed, in our own time, the polyg-
amous underground of primitive Mormons has been harassed under
the Mann Act," 0 though no intelligent observer of this unorthodox
remnant would accuse them of encouraging "vice."
The federal assault on the Mormons, as distinct from the lynch mobs
under quasi-governmental auspices which drove them from Missouri
and Illinois in the 1840s, began in the 1870s with indictments for
bigamy.111 The Mormons raised the issue of freedom of religion, claim-
ing that their practices were protected from governmental infringe-
ment by the first amendment. This argument got short shrift from the
Supreme Court." 2 Chief Justice Waite agreed that Congress could not
"pass a law for the government of Territories which shall prohibit the
free exercise of religion," but promptly held for a unanimous Court that
Mormonism was not a "religion.""13 But the federal government had its
108 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
109 See Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement and the Election of
1896, 15 J. POLrrIcS 3 (1953).
110 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
11 See WEST, KINGDOM OF THE SAINTS ch. 15 (1957).
112 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
118 Id. at 162.
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problems in Utah, particularly in finding juries which would indict and
convict under this heading and in dealing with local officials elected by
those of polygamous persuasion. As we have seen, when confronted with
this sort of local resistance in the South, the national government had
effectively said "boys will be boys" and dropped the matter. But with
the "immoral" Mormons, a different line was taken: In 1882, Congress
passed a statute which barred "bigamists," "polygamists," and "any
person cohabiting with more than one woman" from voting or serving
on juries. Again the Mormons took the matter to court; again the
Supreme Court distinguished between bona fide and spurious religions
and upheld the act. 114
In 1890, the Court finally disposed of the issue in two cases. The
territorial legislature of Idaho passed a drastic statute requiring a test
oath from all voters: Before voting each had to swear that he was not a
member of "any order, organization, or association which teaches,
advises, counsels, or encourages" bigamy, polygamy or plural marriage.
Note that this enactment was aimed at opinion-it did not merely
penalize overt polygamous acts. Justice Field for a unanimous Court
sustained this broad interdiction, denouncing Mormonism in unre-
strained fashion and asserting that "crime is not the less odious because
sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.""
15
Field dismissed the Mormon claim that the Idaho law infringed their
rights under the first amendment (territorial legislatures, it should be
recalled, were congressional instruments) by stating in effect that bad
people have no rights.
Later in the year, Field had reason to modify this extreme view. In
1887, in a Draconic enactment, Congress repealed the federal charter
to the Mormon Church, and confiscated all the nonecclesiastical property
of the religious corporationl As one might imagine, Justice Field took a
dim view of this. While Justice Bradley for the Court upheld the statute,
on the grounds that Congress was "parens patriae" to all federal corpora-
tions with the sovereign's right of escheat, and found no religious issues
whatsoever in the litigation, 116 Chief Justice Fuller with Field and Lamar
dissented. The core of the dissent was that Congress could do anything it
liked with Mormon opinion, but it could not "confiscate" Mormon
property." 7
The suppression of polygamous Mormonism has been examined at
"14 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
115 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890).
116 The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
117 Id. at 66.
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some length for two reasons: First, it is generally overlooked in studies
of civil liberty; and second, it is a classic example of the exercise of
vigorous congressional authority against people adjudged "bad." No
one seemed seriously distressed, except of course the Mormons, by this
imposition of "stateways" on "folkways." Even those who seemed most
convinced, with special reference to the South, that group custom was not
an appropriate subject for social engineering, rushed to bludgeon the
Mormons into conformity.
The last point to be examined in this essay is one which arose from
the imperialist thrust of 1898, and the concomitant acquisition of posses-
sions outside the continental United States. Up to that point, American
expansion had been largely into a vacuum and the settlers took their
law and their institutions with them. A few islands of French and
Spanish culture existed in the Anglo-Saxon sea, but they were of little
consequence in the overall fulfillment of "Manifest Destiny." However,
with the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines and other miscel-
laneous pieces of foreign real estate after the Spanish-American War,. a
new problem emerged. Were the populations of these new territories,
most of whom were non-English speaking, entitled to the full panoply
of constitutional rights? In the current phrase, "Did the Constitution
follow the Flag?"
To make a long story short, the Court in a series of ad hoc determina-
tions over a period of twenty years held that parts of the Constitution
followed the flag, while other parts did not. To supply a theoretical
foundation for this improvisation, Chief Justice White invented two
categories of territory: "incorporated" and "unincorporated"-the whole
Constitution was applicable to a territory which Congress had in-
corporated into the United States, but only fundamental constitutional
principles were resident in those territories not incorporated. This meant
that in the Philippines, for example, which were held to be an "unin-
corporated" territory, the procedural requirements of the Bill of Rights
(grand jury, right to counsel, etc.) were not enforced. In essence, the
Court applied to the unincorporated territories -roughly the same set
of rules that it utilized vis-h-vis the states in procedural questions arising
under the fourteenth amendment and refused, as it had in Hurtado v.
California18 or Twining v. New Jersey1 19 to define the precise content
of the "fundamental" colistitutional provisions which always followed
the flag. The so-called Insular cases120 are above all interesting as re-
51s 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
119 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
120 Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
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markable examples of judicial legislation: Court holdings in this area
were exercises in pure creativity.
To conclude, it is fair to say that the Constitution had no effective
civil liberties content-in the contemporary sense of that category-
throughout the period under analysis. The fourteenth amendment, I am
convinced, was intended to nationalize fundamental individual rights-
both personal and property-and put them under the umbrella of federal
protection.121 But within a decade after the Civil War the idealistic
thrust of Abolitionist political and legal theory had vanished, leaving
only a few lonely voices to maintain the tradition. Outstanding among
them was that turbulent jurist, John Marshall Harlan who asserted in
season and out, for a quarter of a century, that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment had not been weighted down by concern about
states rights, but had designed a strong instrument of national sovereignty
over state and local instrumentalites. It is somehow most appropriate that
today, as the Supreme Court restores the fourteenth amendment to its
pristine power, Court decisions on Negro rights and criminal due process
echo the embattled dissents of that grand old Kentucky Unionist.
197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901).
121 In saying this, I am not challenging Charles Fairman's massively documented
case against full "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, which has sometimes been in-
terpreted as proving that the sponsors of the fourteenth amendment were simply killing
time between important pieces of legislation. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rrv. 5
(1949). I accept Howard Jay Graham's equally substantial arguments in favor of
"selective incorporation," Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954), see particularly note 80 at 19-20. Graham's position escapes
from the polemical overtones of Fairman's massacre of Justice Black and sets forth a
view which Fairman indeed hints at in relaxed moments, e.g., id. at 81, 139.
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